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Abstract: This paper demonstrates theoretically that a profit tax does not affect the distribution of the 
firm’s operations between the official and the underground economy. Or, if the firm was initially 
operating only officially, direct taxation of its business would not be a reason to go underground. Indirect 
taxation in the form of a sales tax does influence an already existing mix of official and underground 
activities, favoring the latter. And, it does constitute a reason to “go underground” for an otherwise fully 
official business. This is a thesis robust to market structure changes and to introducing tax evasion in the 
usual sense, provided the underground demand is inelastic. The tax authority can still collect the planned 
tax revenue through a combination of a cash-flow tax with indirect taxation, under only consumer-
surplus loss by the underground customer.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The literature on the underground economy is vast (see e.g. Aureo & Scheinkman, 2008; Charmes, 2012). 
And, the literature on tax evasion is equally large; (see e.g. the fall 2014 symposium on “Tax Enforcement 
and Compliance” in the Journal of Economic Perspectives). But, to this author’s knowledge, the possibility 
that a tax on business may not be evaded just because it may be shifted to the underground customer has 
certainly slipped attention. Abstracting from cost-of-capital considerations, such should be the case in so 
far as an indirect tax is concerned. Even if underground economy was inexistent, it would have to be 
invented to shift indirect taxation on official sales to the underground customer, to cover with it official 
business tax payments, and escape the indirect tax on the output that is disposed underground. This has 
serious welfare implications not so much for the firm as for the consumer. For the firm, if indirect taxation 
corrects for market power as Dillén (1995) argues, and if the ability to shift this taxation forward 
increases with market power as Karp & Perloff, (1989) appear to suggest, the corrective power of indirect 
taxation decreases. Yet, this decline might be countered under optimal indirect taxation, because it 
presupposes equalization of the after-tax Lerner indexes, tax rates increasing subsequently with 
inelasticity as very well Wang (2011) notes, and increasing inelasticity is one factor conferring increasing 
market power. But, for the consumer the benefit from having the possibility to buy underground is great 
since what this means in the price-quantity space of the official economy is a leftward shift of the demand 
curve enough to cancel out the deadweight loss of taxation. 
 
This is an eventuality worth contemplating to the extent underground demand is inelastic as is supposed 
to be the case a priori since, (i) something that costs for a buyer 𝑥 monetary units officially, someone 
buying it underground is willing to pay any fraction 𝛾 of 𝑥 even if this fraction doubles and triples with 
the passage of time, suffices to continue 𝛾 being less than 𝑥, and (ii) at the given underground market 
price, an underground buyer does not change the seller that circumstances dictate to the buyer. Habit 
formation might be one, for instance, reason explaining this persistence of underground exchange (see 
e.g. Koehne & Kuhn, 2015). Another reason could be a network effect, encouraging underground workers 
to keep purchasing underground commodities (see e.g. Fortin et al., 2000). And, still another reason in 
combination perhaps with the two previous ones might be chronic unemployment (see e.g. Windebank, 
2004). In what follows, the next section elaborates upon the idea of underground forward indirect-tax 
shift exhaustively, taking as a benchmark case that of perfect competition in either type of economy. 
Methodologically, it is actually a quasi-perfectly competitive case: Once the firm can shift production and 
output sold across economy types, the long-run constant-cost type of industry becomes immaterial. And, 
so does the specific shape of the demand curve given that the customer too, can shift across economy 
types. Consequently, we do not have a “textbook perfect competition case”, and no precise statements can 
be made about the tax incidence; but recall that the emphasis here is the study of the possibility of 
shifting indirect taxation onto the underground customer and not the precise shift. Section 3 concludes 
this exercise by deliberating about the welfare and policy implications of this idea. 
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2. Formal Considerations 
 
Starting from full underground production at long-run perfectly competitive equilibrium, expanding to 
official production entails costs à la increasing-cost industry. But, starting from “fully official equilibrium”, 
expanding underground is carried out à la decreasing-cost industry. The expansion is prompted 
presumably by expanding market demand. If the level of demand is given, the shift of production between 
the formal and the informal sectors is made along a positively sloped curve whose points indicate the 
sectoral composition of output at various prices in the sector share (horizontal axis) – price (vertical axis) 
space in which the long-run equilibrium of the official sector is located at the share which is equal to one. 
And, once the customer too, can shift across economy types, the perfectly competitive firm itself is facing 
a negatively sloped demand curve, which can exploit it not as a price-maker but only by varying its 
product across sectors. Measuring the output of both sectors from the origin of the axes in the output-
price space, the demand curve is the line connecting the official equilibrium at official price-output, with 
the underground one at underground price and total, i.e. formal and informal output. These are in sum 
the considerations surrounding the notion of perfect competition which is appropriate to the study of the 
topic investigated below as follows: 
 
 The Basic Argument: Suppose for a moment that a fraction 𝑚 of a perfectly competitive firm’s product is 
already channeled into the underground economy in order to avoid excessive regulations and 
institutional constraints but not for tax evasion purposes. Such an assumption is plausible if one judges 
from what, for example, Singh et al. (2012) report. Using the superscript “𝑠” in connection with the 
standard profit maximization under perfect competition, we have that profit: 
𝛱𝑠 =  1 − 𝑚  𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 + 𝑚 𝑝′ − 𝑐′ 𝑄      (1) 
with 𝑝 > 𝑝′ and 𝑐 > 𝑐′, where 𝑝 is the constant price, 𝑐 is the constant average and marginal cost, 𝑄 
denotes quantity, and the prime (′) connotes the underground economy. Production underground is 
presumably cheaper than officially while who would buy underground if the price there was not lower 
than that in the official sector. Setting 𝑑𝛱𝑠 𝑑𝑄 = 0, one obtains that: 
𝑝𝑠 = 𝑐 +
𝑚𝑐′
1 − 𝑚
−
𝑚
1 − 𝑚
𝑝′𝑠       (2) 
Marginal cost pricing in the official economy, 𝑝𝑠 = 𝑐, implies from (2) such pricing underground too, 
𝑝′𝑠 = 𝑐′. 
Would the introduction of direct taxation in the official of course economy alter this pricing behavior of 
this firm, or would such taxation be a motive to go underground for a firm operating only officially? Using 
index “𝜋” for profit maximization with a profit tax, 𝜏𝜖 0,1 , profits are: 
𝛱𝜋 =  1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜏) 𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 + 𝑚 𝑝′ − 𝑐′ 𝑄      (3) 
From the condition 𝑑𝛱𝜋 𝑑𝑄 = 0: 
𝑝𝜋 = 𝑐 +
𝑚𝑐′
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜏)
−
𝑚
(1 − 𝑚)(1 − 𝜏)
𝑝′𝜋     (4) 
with 𝑝𝜋 = 𝑐 <=> 𝑝′𝜋 = 𝑐′ and hence, 𝑝𝜋 = 𝑝𝑠  and 𝑝′𝜋 = 𝑝′𝑠  at the 𝑄’s maximizing (1). These are the 𝑄’s 
maximizing (3) too, because 𝑝𝜋 > 𝑐 <=> 𝑝′𝜋 < 𝑐′  and 𝑝𝜋 < 𝑐 <=> 𝑝′𝜋 > 𝑐′. This is a replication of the 
well-known result that assuming away cost-of-capital considerations, a profit tax does not affect decision-
making, since the same pricing derives from the “𝑠-problem”, too. The profit tax rate may be positive but 
fully borne by the firm and does not affect the distribution of the firm’s operations between the official 
and the underground economy. Or, if the firm was initially operating only officially, direct taxation of its 
business would not be a reason to go underground. 
Let us ask the same question for the case of indirect taxation. Using index “𝑎” for profit maximization with 
an ad valorem tax, 𝑡𝜖 0,1 : 
𝛱𝑎 =  1 − 𝑚  (1 − 𝑡)𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 + 𝑚 𝑝′ − 𝑐′ 𝑄      (5) 
The first order condition gives that 
𝑝𝑎 = 𝑝𝑠  1 − 𝑡        (6) 
At the optimal 𝑄’s of the “𝑠-problem”, 𝑝′𝑎 = 𝑐′ implies that 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑐  1 − 𝑡 > 𝑐 => 0 > −𝑡, which is true, 
while 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑐 implies that 𝑝′𝑎 = 𝑐′ +  𝑡 1 − 𝑚 𝑐 𝑚  > 𝑐′ => 𝑡 1 − 𝑚 𝑐 > 0, which is also true. It follows 
that if the demand underground is inelastic, it will pay to keep official behavior unaltered and shift the tax 
to the underground customer by raising underground price given the quantity sold there. Or, if the firm 
was operating only officially before the indirect tax, it would be advantageous to start operating 
underground as well: The avoidance of indirect taxation is a reason to go underground provided that 
underground demand is inelastic. 
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These results are illustrated through Figure 1 where the price relationships  𝑝, 𝑝′  are given by lines 
𝑂𝛧 =  𝑐  1 − 𝑡   +  𝑚𝑐′ [ 1 − 𝑚  1 − 𝑡 ]  > 𝑂𝛤 = 𝑐 +  𝑚𝑐′ [ 1 − 𝑚  1 − 𝜏 ]  > 𝑂𝐴 = 𝑐 +
 𝑚𝑐′  1 − 𝑚    and where the trigonometric tangents of 𝜔, 𝑤, and 𝑣 are 𝑚  1 − 𝑚  , 𝑚   1 − 𝑚  1 − 𝑡  ,  
and 𝑚   1 − 𝑚  1 − 𝜏  ,  respectively. For simplicity, 𝑡 = 𝜏 has been postulated so that 𝛧𝛨 can be parallel 
to 𝛤𝛥. For simplicity too, underground demand, 𝐷𝑢 , has been assumed to be fully inelastic for the 
individual seller, and 𝑆𝑢  and 𝑆𝑓  are the underground and the official market supply, with the superscripts 
“𝑢” and “𝑓” denoting presumably the underground and the official economy, respectively. With regard to 
the inelasticity of 𝐷𝑢 , it should be repeated that there is no a priori reason why should an underground 
buyer change the underground seller with whom the buyer deals at the given underground market price 
and so long as this price is lower than the official one. Moreover, the percentage corresponding to 𝑚 is 
hypothesized to be less than 50 percent so that 𝑚  1 − 𝑚  < 1. Line 𝐴𝐵 is the case before any tax, with 
optimal price combination  𝑝𝑠 , 𝑝′𝑠  at point 𝛬. A profit only tax would be associated with a line like 𝛤𝛥, 
cutting 𝐴𝐵 from above at 𝛬, leaving unchanged this price combination. And, a sales only tax is illustrated 
via 𝛧𝛨. 
 
 
What should the policymaker do to restore the tax revenue which is presumably pre-determined in line 
with optimum societal welfare? The answer is to levy a profit tax yielding revenue equal to mtpQ beyond 
the revenue (1-m)tpQ from the ad valorem tax. The profit tax would not alter 𝑝𝑎 : From the maximization 
of: 
𝛱𝑎𝜋 =  1 − 𝑚  1 − 𝜏  (1 − 𝑡)𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 + 𝑚 𝑝′ − 𝑐′ 𝑄       
relation (6) is reproduced in the form: 
𝑝𝑎𝜋 = 𝑝𝜋  1 − 𝑡  . 
Diagrammatically, the new price line would cut 𝛧𝛨 from above at point 𝛴. Part  1 − 𝑚 𝑡𝑝𝑄 of tax 
payment is shifted by the firm to the underground customer and part 𝑚𝑡𝑝𝑄 is borne by the firm. As the 
concluding section below notes, the proposed tax scheme does entail welfare losses especially on the part 
of the underground customer, and the policymaker cannot avoid the emergence of underground 
operations. But, the tax authority can certainly collect the planned tax revenue, which supposedly has 
been budgeted having taken into account this welfare loss.  
 
3. The Issues of Imperfect Competition and Tax Evasion 
 
Would our conclusions so far be modified under profit maximization with perfect competition in the 
official economy but Cournot competition in the underground economy? After all, not all firms decide to 
go underground. This only is assumed here to be the difference among firms. And, subsequently, quantity 
competition is plausible to contemplate, too. Denote profit in this case by superscript “𝜅𝑠”: 
𝛱𝜅𝑠 =  1 − 𝑚  𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 + 𝑚  𝑒 − 𝑏𝑄 − 𝑏𝑄  − 𝑐′ 𝑄     (7) 
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where 𝑝′ = 𝑒 − 𝑏𝑄 − 𝑏𝑄 , with 𝑄  being the output of underground rivals, and with 𝑒 and 𝑏 being some 
constants. From the condition that: 
𝑑𝛱𝜅𝑠
𝑑𝑄
=  1 − 𝑚  𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑚 𝑝′ − 𝑐′ − 𝑚𝑏(𝑄 + 𝑄 ) = 0 
and from the condition that at the optimum: 
𝑄 + 𝑄 =
𝑁 𝑒 − 𝑐′ 
 𝑁 + 1 𝑏
 
one obtains that: 
𝑝𝜅𝑠 = 𝑐 +
𝑚𝑐′
1 − 𝑚
+
𝑚𝑁 𝑒 − 𝑐′ 
 1 − 𝑚  𝑁 + 1 
−
𝑚
1 − 𝑚
𝑝′𝜅𝑠     (8) 
where 𝑁 is the number of firms that go underground. Marginal cost pricing in the official economy, 
𝑝𝜅𝑠 = 𝑐, would imply that 𝑝′𝜅𝑠 =  𝑐′ + 𝑁𝑒  𝑁 + 1  , which exceeds 𝑐′ given that 𝑒 > 𝑐′. 
Under a profit tax and profits indexed now by “𝜅𝜋”: 
𝛱𝜅𝜋 =  1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜏) 𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 + 𝑚  𝑒 − 𝑏𝑄 − 𝑏𝑄  − 𝑐′ 𝑄     (9) 
the relationship between prices becomes: 
𝑝𝜅𝜋 = 𝑐 +
𝑚𝑐′
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜏)
+
𝑚𝑁 𝑒 − 𝑐′ 
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜏) 𝑁 + 1 
−
𝑚
(1 − 𝑚)(1 − 𝜏)
𝑝′𝑘𝜋     (10) 
and as before, a profit tax does not affect decision-making, since 𝑝𝜅𝜋 = 𝑐 = 𝑝𝜅𝑠  implies that 𝑝′𝜅𝜋 = 𝑝′𝜅𝑠 . 
But, in view of an ad valorem tax: 
𝛱𝜅𝑎 =  1 − 𝑚  (1 − 𝑡)𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 + 𝑚  𝑒 − 𝑏𝑄 − 𝑏𝑄  − 𝑐′ 𝑄     (11) 
the price relationship becomes: 
𝑝𝜅𝑎 = 𝑝𝜅𝑠 (1 − 𝑡)      (12) 
At the optimal 𝑄’s of the “𝜅𝑠-problem”, 𝑝′𝜅𝑎 = 𝑐′ implies that  
𝑝𝜅𝑎 =
𝑐
(1 − 𝑡)
+
𝑚𝑁 𝑒 − 𝑐′ 
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝑡) 𝑁 + 1 
 
while from 𝑝𝜅𝑎 = 𝑐 follows that  
𝑝′𝜅𝑎 = 𝑐′ +
𝑡 1 − 𝑚 𝑐
𝑚
+
𝑁 𝑒 − 𝑐′ 
 𝑁 + 1 
 
The diagrammatical illustration of these results is a scaled-up version of Figure 1, which need not bother 
us, since the essence of the argument remains the same: The underground economy is an outlet for 
forward indirect tax shift. It can be easily checked that this would also be true if imperfect competition in 
the official economy was introduced; the mathematical relationships would only become more 
complicated. Neither the introduction of tax evasion would alter this argument. Letting 𝜑 be the 
probability of detection, (3) becomes: 
𝛱𝜀𝜋 = 𝜑 1 − 𝑚  1 − 𝜏  𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 +  1 − 𝜑  1 − 𝑚  𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 + 𝑚 𝑝′ − 𝑐′ 𝑄(13)    
with 
𝑝𝜀𝜋 = 𝑐 +
𝑚𝑐′
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜑𝜏)
−
𝑚
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜑𝜏)
𝑝′𝜀𝜋    (14) 
while (5) becomes: 
𝛱𝜀𝑎 = 𝜑 1 − 𝑚  (1 − 𝑡)𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 +  1 − 𝜑  1 − 𝑚  𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 + 𝑚 𝑝′ − 𝑐′ 𝑄 (15) 
with 
𝑝𝜀𝑎 =
𝑐
1 − 𝜑𝑡
+
𝑚𝑐′
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜑𝑡)
−
𝑚
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜑𝑡)
𝑝′𝜀𝑎     (16) 
where the letter “𝜀” in the superscript designates the tax evasion case. Comparing (14) and (16) with (4) 
and (6), the only change is that 𝜏 and 𝑡 are now multiplied by 𝜑. In the presence of both taxes, 𝛱𝑎𝜋  above 
becomes 
𝛱𝜀𝑎𝜋 1 = 𝜑 1 − 𝑚  1 − 𝜏  (1 − 𝑡)𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 +  1 − 𝜑  1 − 𝑚  (1 − 𝑡)𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 + 𝑚 𝑝′ − 𝑐′ 𝑄   (17) 
with 
𝑝𝜀𝑎𝜋 1 =
𝑐
1 − 𝑡
+
𝑚𝑐′
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝑡) 1 − 𝜑𝜏 
−
𝑚
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝑡) 1 − 𝜑𝜏 
𝑝′𝜀𝑎𝜋 1  (18) 
when tax evasion refers only to the profit tax, and 
𝛱𝜀𝑎𝜋 2 = 𝜑 1 − 𝑚  1 − 𝜏  (1 − 𝑡)𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 +  1 − 𝜑  1 − 𝑚  1 − 𝜏  𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 + 𝑚 𝑝′ − 𝑐′ 𝑄   (19) 
with 
𝑝𝜀𝑎𝜋 2 =
𝑐
1 − 𝜑𝑡
+
𝑚𝑐′
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜏) 1 − 𝜑𝑡 
−
𝑚
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜏) 1 − 𝜑𝑡 
𝑝′𝜀𝑎𝜋 2   (20) 
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when the case is that of indirect tax evasion. Clearly, 𝑝𝜀𝑎𝜋 1 = 𝑝𝜀𝜋 (1 − 𝑡)  and 𝑝𝜀𝑎𝜋 2 = 𝑝𝜀𝑎 (1 − 𝜏) . And, in 
the presence of Cournot competition underground, (13) becomes 
𝛱𝜀𝜅𝜋 = 𝑞 1 − 𝑚  1 − 𝜏  𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 +  1 − 𝑞  1 − 𝑚  𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 + 𝑚  𝑒 − 𝑏𝑄 − 𝑏𝑄  − 𝑐′ 𝑄 
with 
𝑝𝜀𝜅𝜋 = 𝑐 +
𝑚𝑐′
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜑𝜏)
+
𝑚𝑁 𝑒 − 𝑐′ 
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜑𝜏) 𝑁 + 1 
−
𝑚
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜑𝜏)
𝑝′𝜀𝜅𝜋  
while (15) becomes 
𝛱𝜀𝜅𝑎 = 𝑞 1 − 𝑚  (1 − 𝑡)𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 +  1 − 𝑞  1 − 𝑚  𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 + 𝑚  𝑒 − 𝑏𝑄 − 𝑏𝑄  − 𝑐′ 𝑄 
with 
𝑝𝜀𝜅𝑎 =
𝑐
1 − 𝜑𝑡
+
𝑚𝑐′
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜑𝑡)
+
𝑚𝑁 𝑒 − 𝑐′ 
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜑𝑡) 𝑁 + 1 
−
𝑚
 1 − 𝑚 (1 − 𝜑𝑡)
𝑝′𝜀𝜅𝑎  
Relations 𝑝𝜀𝜅𝜋  and 𝑝𝜀𝜅𝑎  are (14) and (16), respectively, incorporating the impact of the ratio: 
𝑚𝑁 𝑒 − 𝑐′  𝑁 + 1  . Would different detection probabilities for the two taxes, 𝜑 for the direct tax, and 𝜓 
for the indirect tax, alter the picture? Profits for the basic case are now: 
𝛱𝜂𝑎𝜋 = 𝜑 1 − 𝑚  1 − 𝜏  (1 − 𝑡)𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 +  1 − 𝜑  1 − 𝑚  (1 − 𝑡)𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄
+ 𝜓  1 − 𝑚  1 − 𝜏  (1 − 𝑡)𝑝 − 𝑐 𝑄 + (1 − 𝜓 ) 1 − 𝑚  1 − 𝜏  𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑚 𝑝′ − 𝑐′ 𝑄 
with 
𝑝𝜂𝑎𝜋 =
  1 − 𝜑𝜏 +  1 − 𝜏  𝑐
𝜃
+
𝑚𝑐′
 1 − 𝑚 𝜗
−
𝑚
 1 − 𝑚 𝜃
𝑝′𝜂𝑎𝜋  
where 𝜃 =   1 − 𝑡  1 − 𝜑𝜏 +  1 − 𝜏 (1 − 𝜓𝑡) , and the answer to the last question is certainly negative.  
 
4. Empirical Considerations 
 
To sum up, a positive correlation coefficient between underground economy and indirect tax incidence 
estimates would be echo empirically the general conclusion from these considerations. Of course, 
calculating this coefficient or engaging in more detailed empirical work based on these estimates would 
turn out to be quite a perplexed task. For one thing, the estimates should be not only by consumption type 
but also for those types whose underground demand is taken somehow to be price inelastic. If not 
anything else, underground economy statistics are provided as percentages of gross domestic product 
(GDP), and so should tax incidence estimates be, but such an approach would assume away the issue of 
underground demand elasticity. And, even if so was actually assumed, the standard approach to estimate 
tax incidence has to calculate from consumer price index and aggregate tax rate on consumption, 
consumption, and output data the quantities involved in a formula like the following one:  
𝐼 =
𝑝−𝑝𝜉
𝑡
+
𝑝𝜉−𝑝𝜁
𝑡𝑝
 
where 𝐼 is the aggregate tax incidence index, while 𝑝, 𝑝𝜉 , and 𝑝𝜁 , are the recorded consumer price index,   
the consumer price index estimated in the absence of taxes, and the consumer price index derived 
somehow at perfectly competitive equilibrium in the absence of taxes too, correspondingly (see e.g. Karp 
& Perloff 1989). “Heroic” assumptions have to be made to derive such an 𝐼, before finally is expressed as a 
percentage of the GDP. Such a task lies certainly outside the scope of this paper. 
 
Moreover, the formula above raises the issue of the role of market power in the official economy, because 
it contains two terms acknowledging thus that the real world is not a perfectly competitive one: To 
assume so has been found to underestimate the incidence, and the second term on the right of the 
formula corrects for this underestimation. It implies that increased market power increases the ability to 
shift a tax in line with theoretical arguments like that by Peitz & Reisinger (2009). But, again, is this true if 
as Konrad et al. (2014, 173), for instance, argue: “Relative to perfect competition, a monopolist bears a 
large share of the burden of a tax increase... as buyers constrain the pricing behavior of a monopolist”? We 
saw that this paper does support the former viewpoint. To continue the present paper searching for the 
conditions that would refute this viewpoint, construct a tax incidence index accordingly, and undertake 
an empirical work under again the aforementioned “heroic” assumptions accompanying it, comprises a 
different rather research agenda. It is enough for us here to have established the intuitive result that there 
is a positive correlation between underground economy and indirect tax incidence. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Indeed, it follows from the above algebra that the underground economy is clearly an outlet of relief from 
indirect taxation. And, it appears that this is a state of affairs not to be worrying a government with a tax 
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authority tying indirect taxation with corporate income taxation as outlined earlier. This, too, is a 
conclusion with much intuitive appeal. Practically the proposed tax combination presupposes a rough 
only knowledge of 𝑚 by sector. More important matter is the welfare implications of this combination. It 
entails loss of consumer surplus beyond the intrinsic regressiveness of a sales tax and especially so with 
regard to the underground customer whose demand is inelastic and who by no means can be identified 
with a white-collar worker. Even more so when optimal indirect taxation presupposes equalization of the 
after-tax Lerner indexes of all commodities and hence, higher tax rates for commodities that have low 
price elasticities of demand or supply provided that the marginal disutility of labor is constant (see e.g. 
Wang, 2011).  
 
At the other end, we know from Harberger (1964) that when all commodities are taxable, the Harberger 
triangles tend to overestimate the welfare loss caused by indirect taxation; much more so when relief is 
found in the underground economy, we should add in this paper. So, the proposed tax combination is 
expected to be more or less neutral with regard to the overall consumer welfare; much more so if 
underground economy is assumed to be maintaining full the overall employment, implying inelastic labor 
supply and hence, a uniform tax rate on all goods at the optimum. Of course, the complexity of the real 
world prevents taxation from being designed optimally, and what should be sought as a second best is a 
well-designed, Pareto improving indirect tax structure. Ideally, a government should be weighing the 
costs and benefits of any policy scheme and hence, of the proposed one too, before implementing it in 
practice. This translates to confining losses to those in consumer surplus, which are inescapable given the 
conditions of inelasticity surrounding underground demand. Towards this end, the profit tax may take the 
form of cash-flow tax as outlined by the relevant literature (see e.g. Edwards, 2003 and Kanniainen & 
Panteghini, 2013). In addition, indirect taxation may be structured so as to alleviate distortions from 
imperfect competition à la Guesnerie & Laffont (1978), Dillén (1995), and others who consider efficiency-
restoring indirect taxation when firms engage in Bertrand-Nash games. Such indirect taxation would 
compensate for the welfare loss associated with the inelasticity of underground demand. 
 
The combination of a cash-flow tax with indirect taxation countering market power is an eventuality 
worth considering empirically too, because as, for instance, Gillis & Kannekens (2014) report, there is an 
overwhelming expansion of indirect taxation, which Bernardi (2013) among others fears that will 
exacerbate the economic slump at least in so far as European Union is concerned. If both Bernardi and the 
thesis herein are correct, the slump will be about the official economy but will be countered by the 
underground consumer and producer. For example, Doerrenberg & Duncan (2014:Abstract) “find that 
access to evasion opportunities reduces the effective tax rate and therefore dampens real behavioral 
responses [and] that the benefits of tax evasion are not limited to the side of the market with access to 
evasion but are partly shifted to the non-evading side of the market”. It is a finding readily extendable to 
include the underground economy in general, countering, for example, Torregrosa’s (1999) conclusion 
that indirect taxation under imperfect competition reduces the balanced budget multiplier. Capital and 
labor will do move underground in response e.g. to fiscal consolidation, leaving the “overall” multiplier 
unchanged, or perhaps, increasing it.  
 
The problem with the tax and the overall fiscal policy is that it is made within the partial equilibrium 
context of official only economy and may be frustrated by the general equilibrium workings deriving from 
the presence of an underground sector as well. The same applies to monetary policy. If, for example, as 
Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2003:Abstract) maintain, “the nominal interest rate acts as an indirect tax on 
monopoly profits [and] the social planner [does not have] access to a direct 100 percent tax on profits, he 
will always find it optimal to deviate from the Friedman rule by setting a positive ... nominal interest rate”, 
the tax will pass on to the consumer, encouraging underground economy. Another example is that 
increased money supply to stimulate consumption will make easier the shift the indirect tax because 
underground transactions are carried through mostly on cash and the increased cash will make them 
easier: What will be stimulated is underground rather than official consumption. 
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